Consider a seller of a divisible good, facing several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting arbitrary menus of contracts. Competition is non-exclusive in that the seller can simultaneously and secretly trade with several buyers. We fully characterize conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. Equilibrium aggregate allocations are unique. Any traded contract must yield zero profit. If a quality is indeed traded, then it is traded efficiently. Depending on parameters, both qualities may be traded, or only one of them, or the market may break down completely to a no-trade equilibrium.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis has spectacularly recalled that the liquidity of financial markets cannot be taken for granted, even for markets that attract many traders and on which exchanged volumes are usually very high. For instance, the issuance of asset-backed securities declined from over 300 billion dollars in 2007 to only a few billion in 2009. 1 Indeed, structured financial products such as mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and credit default swaps, often involve many different underlying assets, and their designers clearly have more information about their quality; this may create an adverse selection problem and reduce liquidity provision. One interpretation of this behavior is that banks became increasingly uncertain about their counterparties' exposure to risky securities. 4 There is also evidence that lending standards and the intensity of screening have been progressively deteriorating with the expansion of the securitization industry in the pre-2007 years. 5 Overall, many attempts at interpreting the recent crisis put at the center stage the difficulties raised by a lack of information on the quality of securities, or on the net position of counterparties. Notice also that most of these securities were traded outside of organized exchanges on over-the-counter markets, with poor information on the trading volume or on the net position of traders. Hence agents were able to interact secretly with multiple partners, at the expense of information release. 6 What economic theory tells us about the impact of adverse selection on competitive outcomes has mainly been developed in the context of two alternative paradigms. Akerlof (1970) studies an economy where privately informed sellers and uninformed buyers act as price-takers. All trades are assumed to take place at the same price. Competitive equilibria typically exist, and feature a form of market failure: because the market clearing price must be equal to the average quality of the goods that are offered by sellers, the highest qualities are generally not traded in equilibrium. It seems therefore natural to investigate whether such a drastic outcome can be avoided by allowing buyers to screen the different qualities of Our analysis builds on the following simple model of trade. There is a finite number of buyers, who compete for a divisible good offered by a single seller. The seller is privately informed of the quality of the good, which can be either low or high. The seller's preferences are strictly convex, but otherwise arbitrary, provided they satisfy a single-crossing property.
Buyers compete by simultaneously posting menus of contracts, where a contract specifies both a quantity and a transfer. After observing the menus offered, and taking into account her private information, or type, the seller chooses which contracts to trade. Our model encompasses pure trade and insurance environments as special cases.
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In this context, we provide a full characterization of the seller's aggregate trades in any pure strategy equilibrium. First, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. This condition can be stated as follows: let v be the average quality of the good. Then, a pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if, at the no-trade point, the low quality type would be willing to sell a small quantity of the good at price v, while the high quality type would be willing to buy a small quantity of the good at price v. Second, we show that the aggregate equilibrium allocations are unique. Any contract traded in equilibrium yields zero profit, so that there are no cross-subsidies across types. In addition, if the willingness to trade at the no trade-point varies enough across types, equilibria are first-best efficient: the low quality type sells the efficient quantity, while the high quality These results suggest that, under non-exclusivity, the seller may only signal her type through the sign of the quantity she proposes to trade with a buyer. This is however a very rough signalling device, and it is only effective when one type acts as a seller, while the other one acts as a buyer. In particular, there is no equilibrium in which both types of the seller trade non-trivial quantities on the same side of the market. Finally, equilibrium allocations can be supported by simple menu offers. For instance, if only the low quality seller is actively trading in equilibrium, the corresponding allocation can be supported by having all buyers offering to purchase any nonnegative quantity at a unit price equal to the low quality. Overall, these findings suggest that non-exclusive competition exacerbates the adverse selection problem: if the first best cannot be achieved, a nonzero level of trades for 8 The labels seller and buyers are only used for expositional purposes. Since offered contracts may well involve negative quantities, both the buyers and the seller can end up trading on any side of the market. In financial markets, a buyer trades a negative quantity when he is selling assets short. Similarly, one can think of insurance companies as buying risk from risk-averse agents who sell their risk for insurance purposes.
one type of the seller can be sustained in equilibrium only if the other type of the seller is left out of the market. That is, the market breakdown originally conjectured by Akerlof (1970) also arises when buyers compete in arbitrary non-exclusive menu offers. In financial markets, the buyers' fear that a seller's willingness to trade essentially reflects her need of getting rid of low quality assets leads to a low provision of liquidity. In the annuity market, consumers with a higher life expectancy will typically not annuitize their retirement savings. 9 From a methodological standpoint, the analysis of non-exclusive competition under adverse selection gives rise to interesting strategic insights. On the one hand, each buyer can build on his competitors' offers by proposing additional trades that are attractive to the seller. Thus new deviations become available to the buyers compared to the exclusive competition case. On the other hand, the fact that competition is non-exclusive also implies that each buyer gets access to a rich set of devices to block such deviations and discipline his competitors. In particular, he can issue latent contracts, that is, contracts that are not traded by the seller on the equilibrium path, but which she finds it profitable to trade in case a buyer deviates from equilibrium play, so as to punish this deviating buyer. Such latent contracts are in particular useful to deter cream-skimming deviations designed to attract one specific type of the seller.
Formally, the best response of any single buyer could in principle be determined by looking at a situation where he would act as a monopsonist, facing a seller whose preferences would be represented by an indirect utility function depending on the profile of menus offered by his competitors. However, because we impose very little structure on the menus that can be offered by the buyers, we cannot assume from the outset that this indirect utility function satisfies useful properties such as, for instance, a single-crossing condition. Moreover, we do not assume that, if the seller has multiple best responses in the continuation game, she necessarily chooses one that is best from the deviator's viewpoint. This rules out using standard mechanism design techniques to characterize each buyer's best response, as Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000) do.
To develop our characterization, we consider instead a series of deviations by a single buyer who designs his own menu offer in such a way that a specific type of the seller will select a particular contract from this menu, along with some other contracts offered by the other buyers. We refer to this technique as pivoting, as the deviating buyer makes strategic 9 Several recent attempts have been made at solving the puzzle of why only a small fraction of individuals purchase life annuities, despite their welfare enhancing role underlined in much of the economic literature (see Brown (2007) for an extensive discussion). To the best of our knowledge, the non-exclusive feature of competition in the annuity market has never been emphasized as a potential source of its breakdown.
use of his competitor's offer to propose attractive trades to the seller. Consider, as an example, the equilibrium allocation characterized by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , where the low-risk agent purchases less than full coverage to signal her quality, while the high-risk agent obtains full coverage. Our analysis shows that this allocation cannot be supported in equilibrium when competition is non-exclusive. The intuition for this result can be provided in the context of a free-entry equilibrium. Indeed, an entrant can earn a positive profit by offering the high-risk agent to purchase an additional quantity of insurance on top of what the low-risk type is trading in equilibrium; the corresponding transfer can be chosen in such a way that the high-risk agent will accept the deviating contract. While this intuition has already been suggested by Jaynes (1978) , our paper generalizes this pivoting technique to get a full characterization of the set of equilibrium aggregate trades.
Related Literature The implications of non-exclusive competition have been extensively studied in moral hazard contexts. Following the seminal contributions of Hellwig (1983) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1993) , many recent works emphasize that, in financial markets where agents can take some non contractible effort, the impossibility of enforcing exclusive contracts can induce positive profits for financial intermediaries and a reduction in trades.
Positive profits arise at equilibrium since none of the intermediaries can profitably deviate without inducing the agents to trade several contracts and select inefficient levels of effort.
10
The present paper rules out moral hazard effects and argues that non-exclusive competition under adverse selection drives intermediaries' profits to zero.
The analysis of adverse selection has been initiated by Pauly (1974) , Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988) . Pauly (1974) suggests that Akerlof outcomes can be supported at equilibrium in a situation where buyers are restricted to offer linear price schedules. As recalled above, Jaynes (1978) points out that the separating equilibrium characterized by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is vulnerable to entry by an insurance company proposing additional trades that could be concealed from the other companies. He further argues that the non-existence problem identified by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) can be overcome if insurance companies can share the information they have about the agents' trades. Hellwig (1988) discusses the relevant extensive form for the inter-firm communication game. Biais et al. (2000) study a model of non-exclusive competition among uninformed marketmakers who supply liquidity to an informed insider whose preferences are quasilinear, and quadratic in the quantities she trades. Although our model encompasses their specification of preferences, we develop our analysis in the two-type case, while Biais et al. (2000) consider a continuum of types. Despite the similarities between the two setups, however, the results of Biais et al. (2000) stand in sharp contrast with ours. Indeed, restricting attention to equilibria where market-makers post convex price schedules, they argue that non-exclusivity may lead to a Cournot-like equilibrium outcome, in which each market-maker earns a positive profit. This is very different from our Bertrand-like equilibrium outcomes, in which each traded contract yields zero profit for each buyer.
Attar, Mariotti, and Salanié (2009) consider a situation where a seller is endowed with one unit of a good whose quality she privately knows. This good is divisible, so that the seller may trade any quantity of it with any of the buyers, as long as she does not trade more than her endowment in the aggregate. Both the buyers' and the seller's preferences are linear in quantities and transfers. In this setting, show that pure strategy equilibria always exist, and that the corresponding aggregate allocations are generically unique. Depending on whether quality is low or high, and on the probability with which quality is high, the seller may either trade her whole endowment, or abstain from trading altogether. Buyers earn zero profit in any equilibrium. These results therefore offer a fully strategic foundation for Akerlof's (1970) classic study of the market for lemons, based on non-exclusive competition. Besides equilibrium existence, a key difference with our setting is that equilibria in may exhibit pooling and hence cross-subsidies across types. This reflects that, unlike in the present paper, trades are subject to an aggregate capacity constraint.
Ales and Maziero (2009) study non-exclusive competition in an insurance context similar to the one studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . Relying on free-entry arguments, they show that only the high-risk agent can obtain a positive coverage in equilibrium. This result is in line with those derived in the present paper, where free entry is not assumed from the outset. Our model is also more general than theirs in that we do not rely on a particular parametric representation of the seller's preferences, which allows us to uncover the common logical structure of a large class of potential applications. Finally, a distinctive feature of our analysis is that we fully characterize the set of aggregate allocations that can be supported in a pure strategy equilibrium, and that we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes pure strategy equilibria. Section 4 derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which such equilibria exist. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
Our model features a seller, who can simultaneously trade with several identical buyers. We put restrictions neither on the sign of the quantities of the good traded by the seller, nor on the sign of the transfers she receives in return. The labels seller and buyers, while useful, are therefore conventional.
The Seller
The seller is privately informed of her preferences. She may be of two types, L or H, with positive probabilities m L and m H such that m L + m H = 1. Subscripts i and j are used to index these types, with the convention that i = j. When type i trades an aggregate quantity Q, for which she receives in exchange an aggregate transfer T , her utility is u i (Q, T ), where the function u i is strictly increasing in its second argument. The following regularity and convexity assumption will be useful at some point of the analysis.
Assumption C For each i, the function u i is continuously differentiable and strictly quasiconcave in (Q, T ).
Under Assumption C, each type's indifference curves are strictly convex. Moreover, for each i, the marginal rate of substitution
is well defined and strictly increasing along type i's indifference curves. Note that τ i (Q, T ) can be interpreted as the seller's marginal cost of supplying a higher quantity, given that she already trades (Q, T ). The following assumption is key to our results.
Assumption SC expresses a standard single-crossing condition: type H is less eager to sell a higher quantity than type L is. As a result, in the (Q, T ) plane, a type H indifference curve crosses a type L indifference curve only once, from below.
The Buyers
There are n ≥ 2 identical buyers. If a buyer receives from type i a quantity q and makes a transfer t in return, he obtains a profit v i q − t. The following assumption will be maintained throughout the analysis.
Assumption CV reflects common values: the seller's type has a direct impact on the buyers' profits. Together with Assumption SC, Assumption CV captures a fundamental tradeoff of our model: type H provides a more valuable good to the buyers than type L, but at a higher marginal cost. These assumptions are natural if we interpret the seller's type as the quality of the good she offers. Together, they create a tension that will be exploited later on: Assumption SC leads type H to offer less of the good, but Assumption CV would induce buyers to demand more of the good offered by type H, if only they could observe quality. Buyers compete in menus for the good offered by the seller.
The Non-Exclusive Trading Game
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The timing of our trading game is thus as follows: 
for all k has a solution for any menu profile (C 1 , . . . , C n ), we suppose hereafter that the buyers' menus are compact sets. This allows us to use perfect Bayesian equilibrium as our equilibrium concept. Throughout the paper, we focus on pure strategy equilibria.
Applications
The following examples illustrate the range of our model.
Pure Trade
In the pure trade model, the seller's utility is quasilinear: 
Insurance
In the insurance model, an agent can sell a risk to several insurance companies. As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is the positive monetary loss that the agent incurs in the bad state. A contract specifies a reimbursement r to be paid in the bad state, and an insurance premium p. Let R be the sum of the reimbursements, and let P be the sum of the insurance premia. We assume that the agent's preferences have an expected utility representation
where u is a strictly concave von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function. The profit of an insurance company from selling the contract (r, p) to type i is p − (1 − π i )r, which can be written as v i q − t if we set
so that Q = R and T = −P . Hence the agent purchases for a transfer −T a reimbursement Q in the bad state, and her expected utility now writes as
Assumption C holds when the function u is strictly concave and differentiable. In that case
, so that Assumption SC requires that type H has a lower probability of incurring a loss, 
respectively, and type averaged individual and aggregate buyers' profits by
respectively. Observe that we can also write
The first term on the right-hand side of this expression is the profit from trading (q k j , t k j ) with both types, while the second term is the profit from further trading (q
with type i only, or, equivalently, the loss in buyer k's profit from trading (q
) with type i. For subsequent use, let us denote this quantity by
Therefore one can compute aggregate profits as if both types were trading (Q j , T j ), yielding aggregate profit vQ j − T j , while type i were trading on top of this
yielding with probability m i additional aggregate profit S i . Finally, define the indirect utility
so that, in equilibrium, one has, for each i and k,
Observe that the functions z
are continuous by Berge's maximum theorem. 
Pivoting
In the remainder of this section, we assume that an equilibrium exists, and we characterize it. In line with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we examine well-chosen deviations by a buyer, and we use the fact that in equilibrium deviations cannot be profitable. A key difference, however, is that in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) competition is exclusive, while in our setting competition is non-exclusive. In that case, we say that buyer k pivots on (Q are endogenous, since they depend on the menus offered by the buyers other than k, on which we impose no restrictions besides compactness. As a result, there is no a priori guarantee that the functions z −k i are well behaved: for instance, they could fail to satisfy a single-crossing condition, unlike the seller's utility function over aggregate trades. This prevents us from using standard mechanism techniques to characterize each buyer's best response. The following lemma encapsulates our pivoting technique.
Lemma 1 Choose k, i, q, and t such that the quantity Q i − q can be traded with the buyers other than k, in exchange for a transfer T i − t. Then
The intuition for this result is as follows. If the pair (Q i − q, T i − t) can be traded with the buyers other than k, then buyer k can pivot on it to attract type i, while still offering the
. If the contract (q, t) allows buyer k to increase the profits he makes with type i, it must be that type j also selects it instead of (q k j , t k j ) following buyer k's deviation; moreover, this contract cannot increase buyer k's average profit if traded by both types i and j, for otherwise we would have constructed a profitable deviation. Now recall from (1) that one can compute aggregate profits as if both types were trading (Q j , T j ) in the aggregate, with type i trading in addition
of Lemma 1 is that, in the aggregate, buyers cannot earn positive profits from making this additional trade with type i. Let us first give an intuition for this result in the free-entry case. Notice that, under free entry, the seller can trade (Q j , T j ) with the existing buyers, so that an entrant can pivot on (Q j , T j ) to attract type i. That is, an entrant could simply propose to buy a quantity Q i − Q j in exchange for a transfer slightly above T i − T j . This contract would certainly attract type i; besides, if it also attracted type j, this would also be good news for the entrant, since
holds when the number of buyers is fixed, although the argument is a bit more involved.
As simple as it is, this result is powerful enough to rule out standard equilibrium outcomes that have been emphasized in the literature. Consider for instance the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) exclusive competition model of insurance provision under adverse selection. In this equilibrium, insurance companies earn zero profit, and no crosssubsidization takes place. Using the parametrization of Section 2.4.2, this means that the equilibrium contract (Q i , T i ) of each type i lies on the line with negative slope
going through the origin. Moreover, the high-risk agent, that is, in our parametrization,
follows that the line connecting these two contracts has a negative slope strictly lower than 
The Zero-Profit Result
In any Bertrand-like setting, the standard argument consists in making buyers compete for any profits that may result from serving the whole demand. This logic also applies to our setting. Indeed, suppose for instance that the aggregate profit from trading with type j is positive, B j > 0. Suppose also for simplicity that there is free entry. Then an entrant could propose to buy Q j in exchange for a transfer slightly above T j . This contract would certainly attract type j, which benefits the entrant; in equilibrium, it must therefore be that this trade also attracts type i, and that vQ j − T j ≤ 0.
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Now recall that aggregate profits may be written as
Our first result in Proposition 1 was that S i ≤ 0, and we just have shown that vQ j − T j ≤ 0 when B j > 0. Hence aggregate profits must be zero. This result can be extended to the case where the number of buyers is fixed.
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium, b
17 This reasoning is once more an application of our pivoting technique. Here the entrant pivots on the no-trade contract (0, 0) to attract type j.
Remark An inspection of the proofs reveal that Propositions 1 and 2 only require weak assumptions on feasible trades, namely that if the quantities q and q are tradable, then so are the quantities q + q and q − q . Hence, we allow for negative and positive trades, but we may for instance have integer constraints on quantities. Finally, we did use in Lemma 1 the fact that the functions u i , and thus the functions z k i , are continuous with respect to transfers, but, for instance, we did not use the fact that the seller's preferences are convex.
Pooling versus Separating Equilibria
We say that an equilibrium is pooling if both types of the seller make the same aggregate trade, that is, Q L = Q H , and that it is separating if they make different aggregate trades, that is, Q L > Q H . We now investigate the basic price structure of these two kinds of candidate equilibria.
Proposition 3 The following holds:
• In any separating equilibrium,
The first statement of Proposition 3 is a direct consequence of the zero-profit result.
Otherwise, the equilibrium is separating, and three possible cases may arise. In case (i), Notice that, when both types trade nonzero quantities in the aggregate, the equilibrium price structure in cases (ii)-(iii) is similar to that described by Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988) in a version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model with non-exclusive competition where insurance companies can share information about their clients. By contrast, when only one type trades a nonzero quantity in the aggregate, the equilibrium price structure is similar to that which prevails in Akerlof (1970) 
The No Cross-Subsidization Result
In this section, we prove that our non-exclusive competition game has no equilibria with cross-subsidies, that is, B L = B H in any equilibrium. This drastically reduces the set of candidate equilibria. Indeed, by Proposition 3, this cross-subsidization result rules out pooling equilibria where Q L = Q H = 0, and separating equilibria where either
The first step of the analysis consists in showing that, if buyers make positive aggregate profits when trading with type j, then type j trades inefficiently in equilibrium. Specifically, her marginal rate of substitution at her equilibrium aggregate trade is not equal to the quality of the good she sells, but rather to the average quality of the good.
The intuition for Lemma 2 is as follows. If τ j (Q j , T j ) were different from v, then any buyer could attempt to reap the aggregate profit on type j, while making limited additional losses on his trades with type i. For this deviation not to be profitable, it must therefore be that, in equilibrium, the profit that each buyer k makes with type j is no less than the aggregate profit B j on type j. This, however, is impossible if the latter is positive, as assumed in Lemma 2.
The second step of the analysis consists in showing that, if buyers make positive aggregate profits when trading with type j, then the aggregate trade made by type j in equilibrium must remain available if any buyer withdraws his menu offer. This would clearly be true under free entry. In our oligopsony model, this rules out Cournot-like outcomes in which the buyers share the market in such a way that each of them is needed to provide type j with her equilibrium aggregate trade, as is the case in the equilibrium described in Biais et al. (2000) . This makes our setting closer to Bertrand competition, and cross-subsidies are harder to sustain. ) with the buyers other than k that allows buyer j to achieve the same level of utility as in equilibrium,
. We finally show that this would allow buyer k to profitably deviate by
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this section. pooling equilibrium is slightly more involved, but reaches the same conclusion. Intuitively, equilibrium cross-subsidies are not sustainable because it is possible to neutralize the bad type, on which a buyer makes losses, by proposing her to mimic the behavior of the good type when facing the other buyers.
In the absence of cross-subsidies, Proposition 3 leads to the conclusion that one must have Q H ≤ 0 ≤ Q L in any equilibrium. Thus two types of equilibrium outcomes that have been emphasized in the literature cannot occur in our model: first, pooling outcomes such as the one described in , in which both types would trade the same nonzero quantity at a price equal to the average quality of the good; second, separating outcomes such as the one described by Jaynes (1978) and Hellwig (1988) , and illustrated on Figure   1 . If one leaves aside the case in which both types trade nonzero quantities on opposite sides of the market, the remaining possibilities for equilibrium outcomes have a structure reminiscent of Akerlof (1970) : either there is no trade in the aggregate, or only one type actively trades in the aggregate, at a unit price equal to the quality of the good she offers.
Equilibrium Aggregate Trades
In this section, we fully characterize the candidate equilibrium aggregate trades, and we provide necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. Given the price structure of equilibria delineated in Section 3.4, all that remains to be done is to give restrictions on each type's equilibrium marginal rate of substitution. Two cases need to be distinguished, according to whether a type's aggregate trade is zero or not in equilibrium.
Our first result is that, if type j does not trade in the aggregate, then her equilibrium marginal rate of substitution must lie between v and v j . Our second result is that, if type i trades a nonzero quantity in the aggregate, then she must trade efficiently in equilibrium.
Lemma 5 If
The intuition for Lemma 5 is as follows. Suppose that i = L. Since cross-subsidization Hence type L must trade efficiently in equilibrium. The case i = H can be handled in a symmetric way.
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To state our characterization result, it is necessary to define first-best quantities. The following assumption ensures that these quantities are well defined.
Assumption FB For each i, there exists Q
Assumption FB states that Q * i is the efficient quantity for type i to trade at a unit price v i that gives an aggregate zero profit for the buyers. In the pure trade model, Q * i is defined by c i (Q * i ) = v i . In the insurance model, because or the seller's risk aversion, efficiency requires full insurance for all types, so that 
Theorem 1 If an equilibrium exists, then τ
• Otherwise, all equilibria are separating, and is too eager to sell. In the insurance model, no equilibrium exists if to pivot on (Q j , T j ) to attract type i, while preserving the profit he makes by trading with type j. However, for the argument to go through, there must be no restrictions on the signs of the quantities traded in such deviations; in particular, it is crucial that the deviator be 22 In the non-generic case where θ H = v, there also exist separating equilibria in which 0 < Q H ≤ 1. able to induce type i to consume more than Q i in the aggregate. 23 
This, however, is precisely
what is impossible to do in the presence of a capacity constraint, when both types trade up to capacity in the candidate equilibrium, as in the pooling equilibrium described in . Thus it is the capacity constraint, and not the linearity of the preferences per se, that constitutes the key difference between their model and the one studied in this paper.
Equilibrium Individual Trades
So far, we have focused on the aggregate equilibrium implications of our model. In this section, we briefly sketch a few implications for individual equilibrium trades. First, we show that our no cross-subsidization result also holds at the level of individual buyers. Our second result states that aggregate and individual equilibrium trades have the same sign. This reinforces the basic insight of our model that, in equilibrium, the seller can signal her type only through the sign of the quantities she trades.
Proposition 6 In any equilibrium, q
It follows from Proposition 6 that if a type does not trade in the aggregate, then she does not trade at all, so that the pooling equilibrium, when it exists, is actually a no-trade equilibrium. Observe also that, when a type trades a nonzero quantity in the aggregate, there need not be more than one active buyer, as will be clear from considering the equilibria we now construct.
Equilibrium Existence
To establish the existence of an equilibrium, we impose the following technical assumption on preferences. Consider for instance case (ii), and suppose that a buyer attempts to deviate and purchase from type H only. To be successful, this cream-skimming deviation must involve trading a relatively small quantity at a relatively high price. However, this contract becomes also attractive to type L if, along with it, she can make enough further trades at the equilibrium price v L , so as to obtain a higher utility than in equilibrium. This implies that the deviating buyer can obtain at most the profit from a pooling deviation, which is easily shown to be nonpositive.
Assumption T There exist Q L and Q H such that
Whenever the equilibrium is pooling, two situations can arise. If the bounds Q L and Q H in Assumption T can be chosen in such a way that Q L ≤ 0 ≤ Q H , it is straightforward to show that even a monopsonist would be unable to improve over the no-trade outcome, and extract rents from the seller.
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The equilibrium menus can then be reduced to the no-trade contract. Things are more complex when Q L and Q H cannot be chosen in such a way that Q L ≤ 0 ≤ Q H , for, in this case, there are situations where a monopsonist could make profits by offering each type to trade a specific contract, distinct from the trivial one. To block the corresponding deviations, latent contracts must be available in equilibrium. We construct the equilibrium menus in such a way that buyers offer to trade any positive quantity at a unit price v L , and any negative quantity at a unit price v H , up to some limits. Since v H > v L , this can intuitively be interpreted as a bid-ask spread.
A noticeable feature of our construction is that, in any scenario, no contract issued in equilibrium could potentially make losses. This reflects an extreme fear of adverse selection, and should be contrasted with the equilibrium of an exclusive competition game such as Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) , in which the contract designed for the low-risk agent would make losses if traded by the high-risk agent.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of adverse selection on markets where competition is non-exclusive. We fully characterized aggregate equilibrium allocations, which are uniquely determined, and we gave a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Our results show that, under non-exclusivity, market breakdown may arise in a competitive environment where buyers can compete through arbitrary menu offers: specifically, whenever first-best allocations cannot be achieved, equilibria when they exist involve no trade for at least one type of the seller. 
Thus, the monopsonist's profit, which can be rewritten as vQ quality of the good she offers by trading an inefficient, but nonzero quantity of this good.
When competition is non-exclusive, each buyer's inability to control the seller's trades with his opponents creates additional deviation opportunities. This makes screening more costly, and implies that the seller either trades efficiently, or does not trade at all.
There has been so far little investigation of the welfare implications of adverse selection in markets where competition is non-exclusive. A natural development of our analysis would be to study the decision problem faced by a planner who wants to implement an efficient allocation, subject to informational constraints, but also to the constraint that exclusivity be non-enforceable. It is unclear that such a planner can improve on the market allocations 
However, from the assumption 
by Lemma 1. We now show that S i ≤ s k i for all i and k, which implies the result by summing over k. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists i and k such that S i > s k i . Then, from (2), S j > 0. Therefore there exists l such that S j > s l j . Now, (2) remains valid if one exchanges i and j, so that S i > 0. Since Proof of Proposition 2. We first prove that for each j and k, one has 
Because B H ≤ 0, S L < 0 and Q H ≥ 0, we get that B < 0, a contradiction. Therefore it must be that S L = 0. It follows that B = vQ H − T H , so that T H = vQ H since B = 0.
Hence the result. Case (iii) follows in a similar manner, exchanging the roles of L and H. 
Consider finally case
Letting ε i , ε j , and δ j go to zero yields that B j ≤ b k j . Since this holds for any buyer k, we can sum over k to get B j ≤ 0, a contradiction. The result follows. , one gets
Therefore, by Lemma 1, one must have
, this implies that
can be traded with the buyers other than k, in exchange for a transfer T i − t 1 . Moreover, using the fact that S i = 0 and T j = vQ j by Proposition 3, and that
, that is, again using S i = 0 and
, this implies that 
Now, recall that, as a consequence of Assumption SC,
Therefore, letting δ i and ε i go to zero in (6), we get Q i = Q j , so that the equilibrium must be pooling.
Replacing in (6), what we have shown is that for any small enough δ i and ε i such that 
Suppose next that a separating equilibrium exists. Then, according again to the no crosssubsidization result, only three scenarios are possible.
(i) In the first case,
(ii) In the second case,
(iii) In the third case,
To conclude the proof, observe that, from (7) to (10) 
so that we get (12) by Lemma 1. Now, suppose by way of contradiction that s k i > 0 for some i and k. Then, by (12),
for all l = k. Summing on l = k yields
From Proposition 1, we know that
for all l = k. Combining (13) and (14) 
Observe that, in formulating the participation constraints, we implicitly supposed that the equilibrium aggregate trade of each type remains available following buyer k's deviation.
Separating Equilibria There are three subcases to examine. 
We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each buyer offers the menu
By construction, the equilibrium aggregate trade of type L remains available following buyer k's deviation. An upper bound to buyer k's profit from deviating is given by
subject to the participation constraints (17) and (18) . For each i, one must thus solve 
where n i and n j are the numbers of times type i optimally trades the contracts (Q * i , v i Q * i ) and (Q * j , v j Q * j ), respectively, with the buyers other than k. Thus
where the first inequality reflects that v H > v L and Q * L > 0 > Q * H , and the second that ( 
Fix one such Q L . We show that there exists an equilibrium in which each buyer offers the menu (17) , (15) 
The following result reflects how the structure of offers in the menus C LH affects the seller's behavior following a deviation by buyer k. 
Consider now (Q L ,T L ), as defined in Fact 1. One must haveQ L ≥ 0, for, otherwise, (17) along with the fact that (18) is binding would imply that (16) 
which again is at most zero. Hence there is no profitable deviation for buyer k such that 
